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1 Introduction
Recent empirical work has shown that trading firms are much different from non-traders.
Exporting firms are larger, more productive, pay higher wages and charge higher prices
(Bernard and Jensen, 1995). A more recent literature have concluded that firms importing
intermediate inputs are also more productive, larger, charge higher prices and pay more
for imported goods (Halpern, Koren and Szeidl, 2011; Kugler and Verhoogen, 2009). Large
exporters are also large importers, and a large part of the exporter premium can be explained
by differences in the import status (Amiti, Itskhoki and Konings, 2012). Why trading firms
perform better is however still subject to debate. Self-selection into trading and reallocation
of market shares toward better performing firms as in Melitz (2003) seem to be only part of
the explanation; recent research suggests that trading induces improvements also within the
firm.1
Traders’ premia in productivity and size may imply that the market power of interna-
tionalized firms is also larger. Indeed, De Loecker and Warzynski (2012) provide evidence
that exporting firms charge higher markup over marginal cost. In this paper we dig deeper
into the question how the different dimensions of internationalization are related to market
power. We argue that importing has an unambiguously positive association with markups
because both self-selection and a quality-improving effect of imported inputs point into a
markup premium of importers. Exporting, on the other hand, may have a more ambiguous
relationship with markups, because the effect of self-selection may be offset by the effect of
1Access to export markets may foster innovation activities within the firm (Yeaple, 2005; Bustos, 2011)
and the availability of new and better input varieties through imports can also improve firm performance
(Halpern, Koren and Szeidl, 2011).
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tougher competition on export markets.
We provide empirical evidence on Hungarian manufacturing firms in years 1995-2003
to confirm these arguments. First, we estimate firm-level markup and TFP from balance
sheet data following the methodology of De Loecker and Warzynski (2012), who in turn
build on the work of Hall (1986) and Klette (1999).2 Then, we create measures for the
scope of importing intermediate inputs and exporting activities from detailed trade data
and investigate the relationship between markup, TFP and trading. Our main empirical
findings are the following. First, we show that importing is associated with a large markup
premium, while the premium of exporting becomes insignificant when we control for the
import status. Second, we find that larger import intensity in material use is associated
with higher markups, while this is not the case for export intensity. Third, productivity
differences explain much from trading premia, but the importer premium remains positive
even when controlling for productivity. Fourth, on large developed foreign markets, where
competition is supposedly tougher, export premia are smaller (more negative).
We use a variable markups heterogeneous firm model to explain these observations. The
model follows the Melitz and Ottaviano (2008) framework in terms of the market structure.
We extend this model with the assumption that, after paying some fixed cost, firms can
import high quality inputs, which enables them to increase the quality of their output. To
model this, we use the structure of the model in Antoniades (2015), but with replacing
innovation in that model with importing. In our framework importing inputs leads to an
2De Loecker (2011) and De Loecker, Goldberg, Khandelwal and Pavcnik (2012) use physical production
data instead of values to estimate markups, which is shown to extends the flexibility of markup estimation.
We cannot follow this approach for data limitations.
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improvement in quality and an increase of the markup.3 This was motivated by the increasing
amount of empirical evidence that higher markup firms use higher quality inputs which may
come from importing (e.g. Kugler and Verhoogen, 2009, 2012a; Atkin, Chaudhry, Chaudry,
Khandelwal and Verhoogen, 2015).
The model also provides predictions for the export side, which are also in line with our
observations. While positive productivity sorting leads to a positive association between
exporting and markups, the tougher competition on the export market may offset this ef-
fect. We show that as a result the relationship between productivity and firm-level average
markups becomes non-monotonic: firms with small export shares can have lower average
markups than firms with a productivity level just below the threshold for exporting.
The mechanisms we study here are related to the questions on the magnitude of gains
from trade. Arkolakis, Costinot, Donaldson and Rodr´ıguez-Clare (2012) argue that taking
into account variable markups yields weakly lower gains from trade resulting from trade
liberalization, because exporters to the domestic market reduce their prices by less than
the tariff cut. Our results provide additional support for the gain-reducing role of variable
markups because, as our findings suggest, the pass-through of lower import costs to prices is
also incomplete. In this regard, we provide complementary evidence to De Loecker, Goldberg,
Khandelwal and Pavcnik (2012), who also show on the example of India’s trade liberalization
the incomplete cost pass-through to prices. In contrast to this gain-reducing effect, however,
3An alternative way to model the beneficial effects of importing would be to rely on a productivity-
increasing mechanism as in Halpern, Koren and Szeidl (2011). We have chosen the quality-improving hy-
pothesis because its more in line with our empirical finding that importer markup premia are positive even
when controlling for productivity.
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we also argue that international trade may offer an additional advantage. Trade liberalization
may help importers to produce higher quality goods, which is suggested by our empirical
finding that importer markups are higher even when controlling for productivity.
Our paper builds on a growing empirical literature on the productivity premium from
importing intermediate inputs, which is often found to be at least as important as the
productivity premium from exporting. Kasahara and Rodrigue (2008), for example, showed
that starting to import intermediate goods led to a productivity increase in Chile. The
productivity premium of importers, and especially two-way traders, is found to be large by
Smeets and Warzynski (2013) for Denmark and Vogel and Wagner (2010) for Germany. Amiti
and Konings (2007), Topalova and Khandelwal (2011), and Goldberg, Khandelwal, Pavcnik
and Topalova (2010) document the productivity-increasing effect of import liberalization
episodes. A theoretical contribution to this literature is Halpern, Koren and Szeidl (2011),
who have built a model in which importing each intermediate input requires some sunk cost,
but using more high-quality imported intermediate inputs leads to increased productivity.
They confirm the predictions of this model using the same Hungarian firm data we analize
in this paper. Kasahara and Lapham (2013) uses a similar framework of simultaneous choice
whether to export or use imported intermediaries, and test the predictions on Chilean firm-
level data. In this paper we also find that importers and exporters are indeed more productive
than non-traders and this productivity difference partly explains the markup premia.
We also relate to the recent literature which investigates the role higher quality inputs
play in better firm performance. A mechanism for how input quality affects productivity
is proposed in Kugler and Verhoogen (2012b) in a heterogeneous firm model framework, in
which firms can choose both inputs and outputs endogenously. Atkin, Chaudhry, Chaudry,
5
Khandelwal and Verhoogen (2015) show that soccer ball producers in Pakistan who charge
higher markups also produce higher quality balls and buy more expensive inputs. The
results of Kugler and Verhoogen (2009) suggest that importing is potentially a key source of
higher quality inputs. In this paper we provide suggestive evidence for a large set of firms
that importing indeed helps in producing higher quality outputs, for which they can charge
higher markups.
A line of literature develops heterogeneous firm models with variable markup by departing
from the CES utility function.4 The influential paper of Melitz and Ottaviano (2008) develops
a general framework with a quadratic utility function and monopolistic competition in which
markups in export markets differ systematically because of different competitive conditions.
Mayer, Melitz and Ottaviano (2014) have expanded this model to multi-product firms to
generate new predictions on the product mix of exporters. Our simple theoretical framework
builds on Melitz and Ottaviano (2008) and the hypothesis that importing enables a firm to
access higher quality inputs and, hence, produce higher quality output.5 When introducing
the model, we also take into account that we can only observe markups at the firm, rather
than the firm-product-destination level. This framework shows that exporting and importing
can have quite different effects on markups because of the possibility that competition in
export markets is stronger.
The structure of the paper is the following. Section 2 introduces the dataset and presents
4See e.g. Krugman (1979), Melitz and Ottaviano (2008) with quadratic utility function, and Feenstra
and Weinstein (2010) or Novy (2013) with translog expenditure function.
5Amiti, Itskhoki and Konings (2012) build a model of exchange rate pass-through which includes both
variable markups and the imported input productivity premium from Halpern, Koren and Szeidl (2011). An
alternative variable markups model was developed by Atkeson and Burstein (2008).
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its most important characteristics. Section 3 introduces the methodology of estimating
markups and productivity and provides descriptive evidence on the estimates. In Section 4
we develop our theoretical framework. Section 5 presents the main empirical findings, while
Section 6 includes the robustness checks. Section 7 concludes.
2 Data and estimation sample
Our database consists of the universe of Hungarian manufacturing firms with more than 5
employees in years between 1995 and 2003. It combines data from the firms’ balance sheets
and earnings statements and detailed export and import data from the Hungarian Customs
Statistics.
In the balance sheet and earnings statement data we observe sales, employment, fixed
assets, various cost measures including expenditures on labor and materials, as well as own-
ership structure (foreign-owned, domestic state-owned, domestic privately owned). We do
not observe product and factor input prices or quantities, although the average wage per
employee can be calculated as the ratio of the total wage expenditure to the number of
employees.
The Customs Statistics report data on essentially all export and import flows, both
as value and quantity, of each firm by 6-digit HS (Harmonized System) product category,
partner country and year. We identify imports of intermediate inputs as the imports of
products that belong to the relevant BEC (Broad Economic Categories) codes.6
We clean the export flows of firms in order to eliminate possible carry-along export
6BEC codes 111, 121, 21, 22, 31, 322, 42, 53 cover intermediate inputs, as defined by the United Nations.
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activities or sales of irregular items, including capital goods. We measure a firm’s export
sales as total exports of goods that belong to the firm’s core export profile, where we define
the core profile as the two-digit product code of which the firm generates the largest export
revenue during the sample period.
We also eliminate from the sample firms with state ownership above 10% ever during the
sample period. This makes us exclude 1,081 unique firms. Pricing decisions of state-owned
firms are more likely to have been affected by some form of price regulation, which we want
to rule out here.
Furthermore, we exclude firm-year observations with a large amount of processing trade.
Firms engaged in processing trade import and re-export intermediate goods after performing
a task on them for a fee, while the product remains the property of the foreign party. Prices in
such activities may be determined very differently than in the case of non-processing trade,
hence including this may bias our estimates. Processing trade is not reported in balance
sheet data, but it is part of the customs statistics. Following Halpern, Koren and Szeidl
(2011) we capture processing trade as the difference between customs exports and balance
sheet exports of a firm, if positive. We drop firm-years, where the share of processing trade
to total revenue exceeds 5%, which is the median share across firms with processing trade.
This makes us exclude around 8,800 firm-year observations.
After all data cleaning, our sample includes 31,333 firm-year observations with 7,832
unique firms in nine years (1995-2003).
Table 1 reports some descriptive statistics. Trading firms are larger, both in terms of em-
ployment and sales revenue, more productive in terms of sales per worker, and more capital-
intensive than non-traders. Firms that both export their products and import materials
8
Table 1: Descriptive statistics
Non-trader Exporter Importer Two-way Full sample
Employment 29 35 44 152 82
Sales per worker (mn HUF) 7.2 8.2 12.5 14.6 10.9
Capital per worker (mn HUF) 1.7 2.2 2.7 3.9 2.8
Material share in output 61.3% 64.4% 67.2% 65.6% 64.1%
Export intensity 15.7% 29.1% 13.7%
Import intensity 13.3% 25.2% 11.8%
Foreign owned 5.7% 8.5% 14.6% 44.0% 22.7%
Number of observations 11,592 3,397 3,484 12,860 31,333
Number of firms 3,821 1,724 1,722 3,612 7,832
Notes: All are means unless otherwise reported. Trading status is determined for firm-year observations. Numbers of
firms by status add up to more than the number of firms in the whole sample due to firms switching status. Export
intensity is export sales over total sales, import intensity is expenditure on imported intermediate inputs over total
expenditure on intermediate inputs.
(two-way traders) are by far the largest and trade more intensively than others. The share
of exports in their sales revenue (export intensity) and the share of imported intermediate
inputs in their total expenditure on intermediate inputs (import intensity) are considerably
larger than for firms that either export only or import only. Finally, the prevalence of foreign
ownership also increases considerably with the involvement in international trade.
3 Estimating productivity and markups
We estimate the total factor productivity (TFP) and the markup of the firm jointly following
De Loecker and Warzynski (2012). The method of estimating TFP relies on structural
production function estimation in the spirit of Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) and, more closely,
Ackerberg, Caves and Frazer (2006). The markup estimate is based on the insight of Hall
(1986) that, for a cost-minimizing producer, markup equals the ratio of the output elasticity
of a variable input free of adjustment costs (labor or materials) to the input’s revenue share.
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The first-order condition for a cost-minimizing producer i with continuous and twice
differentiable production function in period t implies that, for a given variable input (here
labor, l), the markup is
µit = θ
l
it
(
αlit
)−1
, (1)
where µit denotes firm markup in period t, θ
l is the output elasticity of labor and αl = wL
PQ
is
the share of the expenditure on labor (wagebill, wL) in the total revenue of the firm (PQ).
While the revenue share of labor is directly observable in the data, the output elasticity can
only be estimated from a production function.
As baseline we assume a Translog production technology with Hicks-neutral productivity,
and estimate a production function on the value added as follows.
yit = βllit + βkkit + βlll
2
it + βkkk
2
it + βlklitkit + ωit + it, (2)
where all variables are in logs, y is value added of production, l and k denote labor and
capital, respectively, and the βs are parameters. Total factor productivity is captured by ω
and  is the error term containing unanticipated shocks to the producer and measurement
error.
To allow for industry differences in the production technology parameters, we do the
estimation procedure separately for 19 broad industry groups.7 We measure value added
with firm revenue less expenditures on material inputs, labor with the number of employees,
and capital with the book value of tangible assets. Unfortunately, we observe neither physical
7These are the two-digit NACE industries from 15 to 37. We merge some smaller industries into larger
ones (tobacco with food, office machinery with electrical machinery, recycling with manufacturing n.e.c.)
and exclude energy manufacturing (23).
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quantities nor firm-level prices. Therefore we deflate all variables with available industry-
specific price indices.8
For robustness, we will experiment with alternative specifications of the production func-
tion (Section 6). These include a Cobb-Douglas specification and production functions on
gross output. Clearly, in the case of a gross output production function there are two variable
inputs (labor and materials) from which the markup (1) can be calculated.
With the help of structural estimation (first proposed by Olley and Pakes (1996)) our
estimation accounts for the fact that we do not observe ωit in (2). That productivity is unob-
servable to the econometrician but not to the firm is problematic, because firm decisions on
variable inputs are most likely endogeneous to such contemporaneous productivity changes.
If we estimate (2) with simple OLS and an error term uit = ωit+it, the correlatedness of the
variable input on the right-hand side with ω in the error will lead to biased and inconsistent
parameter estimates.
The method we use follows Ackerberg, Caves and Frazer (2006) and proxies unobserved
productivity with observed input choices, more specifically by inverting the demand function
for materials (assuming that it is strictly monotonic, hence invertable). Productivity is then
expressed as
ωit = ht(mit, kit, lit, zit),
where ht(.) is the inverted demand function for materials which, for simplicity, is treated
as non-parametric, mit denotes materials, kit and lit are capital and labor, both determined
8While the use of deflation is clearly inferior, De Loecker and Warzynski (2012) show that it affects only
the level of the markup estimates, and not the correlation between markups and firm-level characteristics
(such as the exporting or importing status).
11
before the firm decides on its material input, and zit contains other controls affecting material
demand. In this application we include dummies for being exporter or material importer in
t as other controls.
The estimation proceeds in two steps and closely follows the procedure of De Loecker
and Warzynski (2012). In the first stage we estimate (2) with the proxy for productivity,
ht(.), substituting for ωit. Note that in this step none of the β parameters can be estimated,
since the inputs and the proxy for productivity are perfectly collinear. However, using the
first-stage fitted values, φˆit, we can express productivity as
ωit(β) = φˆit − βllit − βkkit − βlll2it − βkkk2it − βlklitkit. (3)
In the second stage, we estimate the production function parameters with a GMM pro-
cedure. We assume a law of motion for productivity, where current-period productivity is
a nonparametric function (approximated by a third-order polynomial) of the productivity
level in the previous period, plus an innovation term, ξit,
ωit = gt(ωit−1) + ξit. (4)
The orthogonality conditions exploit the fact that the current-period innovation to pro-
ductivity must be uncorrelated with the input levels set by the firm in the previous period.
Hence, the moment conditions are
E

ξit(β)

lit−1
kit
l2it−1
k2it
lit−1kit


= 0,
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where ξit(β) is given by (3) and (4) and we take into account that current-period capital is
determined in the previous period.
Having the estimated production function coefficients and the fitted values from the first-
stage regression at hand, we can calculate firm-level productivity from (3). We calculate the
firm markup by applying (1) to the labor input, where the output elasticity of labor under
the Translog production technology is
θˆlit = βˆl + 2βˆlllit + βˆlkkit. (5)
When calculating the revenue share of labor (αlit) we take into account that output may
be subject to measurement error and so the observed output is Q˜it = Qit exp(it). Hence,
following De Loecker and Warzynski (2012), we obtain αˆlit using a corrected output measure,
Q˜it
exp(ˆit)
, where ˆit is the residual from the first-stage regression.
9
We find that the median firm in our sample charges around 50% markup over marginal
cost.10 As we will show in Section 6 this figure may vary by altering the specification of
the production function, but the correlation among the alternative estimates is strong. Our
median markup estimate is also comparable to, though slightly larger than, the estimates
of De Loecker and Warzynski (2012) on Slovenian and De Loecker et al. (2012) on Indian
9Note the difference between the Translog and the Cobb-Douglas production function. Under Cobb-
Douglas the estimated output elasticity of labor is constant within each industry and markups vary across
firms because the differences in revenue share. As opposed to that, the Translog specification yields output
elasticities which vary across firms, so markup variation comes both from the variation in the estimated
output elasticity and the revenue share.
10We clean the markup estimate from outliers below zero or above 10. Occurrence of outliers is low, not
exceeding half a per cent of the observations.
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data.11
The estimated markup is quite stable across the years, showing a slight increase up to year
1998 and then a slow but gradual decline. Clearly, there is considerable variation in markups
across industries, which explains close to 40% of the total variation in the logarithm of the
firm-year markups. We find the largest markups in the tobacco industry (above 200%) and
printing and publishing (160%), while smaller ones are more common in, for example, leather,
wearing and apparel and wood manufacturing. Overall, the median markup estimates in
most two-digit industries fall in the reasonable range of 1–2.
Table 2: Markups and productivity
(1) (2) (3)
Dependent variable: log markup
log TFP 0.368*** 0.351*** 0.338***
(0.028) (0.026) (0.088)
foreign owned 0.053*** -0.032
(0.016) (0.021)
Size dummies yes yes
Industry-year dummies yes yes
Firm dummies yes
Year dummies yes
Observations 31,333 31,333 31,333
R-squared 0.465 0.469 0.906
Notes: Markup and TFP are estimated from a value added Translog
production function following De Loecker and Warzynski (2012). Size
dummies are defined on the number of employees (between 5 and 20,
between 20 and 100, above 100). Industry-year fixed effects are with two-
digit industries. Robust standard errors with two-digit industry clusters
are in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
We find strong positive association between firm-level markups and productivity. Table 2
reports results from regressions of the logarithm of markup on the logarithm of productivity.
11In contrast to our database, which includes privately owned manufacturing firms above 5 employees, the
Slovenian data includes all manufacturing firms regardless of size and ownership, while the Indian study uses
the Prowess panel of mainly medium-sized firms.
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Both within industry-years and within firms higher firm productivity is accompanied by
higher markup, even after controlling for foreign ownership and the size of the firm. The
finding that more productive firms charge significantly higher markups is in line with the
implications of existing variable markup models.
Finally, let us look at how our markup estimate vary with the trading status of the firm.
Figure 1 shows the cumulative distribution of markups (in logarithm) by trading status after
netting out industry trends. Firms that import materials seem to charge higher markups
than non-importer firms in the same industry and year. This positive markup premium
is larger for firms that import only than for two-way traders. Non-traders and firms that
export only have very similar markup distributions, the equality of which cannot be rejected
by a Kolmogorov-Smirnov test at 5% significance level.
Figure 1: Cumulative distribution function of markups by trading status
In the next section we aim to explain with a theoretical framework the patter of markups
in relation to the firm’s trading status. Then, in Chapter 5 we provide further empirical
15
evidence and test some of the model implications.
4 Theoretical approach
We interpret our results with a simple framework including variable markups with fixed entry
costs into the import market. Our framework is based on a partial equilibrium version of
the Melitz and Ottaviano (2008) model extended with endogenous product quality following
Antoniades (2015). In our framework, import share will play a similar role as quality in
the Antoniades model: a product produced with a larger share of imported inputs is more
valuable for the consumers, hence shifts the demand curve up. We also append the model
in two ways to adapt it more to the characteristics of importing. First, we introduce a fixed
cost for starting to import. As opposed to investing in quality in general, which all firms do
to some extent, not all firms import, which calls for the presence of a fixed cost. Moreover, a
fixed cost of importing is also in line with our findings of large importer premiums and with
the observation that few firms import small quantities. Second, in contrast to Antoniades
(2015), we assume that a firm has to pay the fixed cost of importing only once rather than
separately for the domestic and import markets. While this modification reduces tractability,
we find it more realistic in our case.12 Note however that this modification does not matter
much for the main predictions of the model.
We also simplify the model in order to make it more tractable. First, we focus our
attention on the two country case. The two countries are home and the rest of the world,
12Under the assumptions of the original Antoniades (2015) model we would find many firms selling higher
quality versions of their products in the domestic market than in the export market.
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and we assume that the rest of the world is larger, and competition in that market is
stronger (which is a general equilibrium consequence of the larger market size in the full
Melitz-Ottaviano framework), hence prices are lower there. This simplification of having
two countries is mainly driven by the nature of our dataset, where we can only observe one
markup for each firm-year, hence we cannot observe the markup in each country. Deriving
such an average from a model with many countries would require many assumptions about
the joint distribution of country size and strength of competition across countries.
Our model focuses on the quality-increasing effects of importing. As Halpern, Koren
and Szeidl (2011) argues, however, another important consequence of importing is increased
productivity, which should also be related to markups. Still, we focus on quality improvement
for two reasons. First, as we can control form productivity empirically, we can show that
markups are higher even after partialling out productivity, hence our framework should be
able to explain this stylized fact. Second, as we study markups, we focus on the novel
mechanism which directly affects markups rather than indirectly through productivity.
Intuitively, the story is the following. First, the model will predict a positive effect
of imports on markups because of their quality-increasing effects. Also, as the bundle of
imported inputs is determined endogenously, more productive firms will tend to import
more intermediate inputs. This selection effect simply reinforces the positive relationship
between imported inputs and markups.
Second, the model predicts a non-monotonic relationship between the scope of exports
and firm-level markups. On the one hand, there is a selection effect: more productive firms
are more likely to enter the export market. On the other hand, competition is stronger on the
export market, which drives down the markups of exporters. We will show that this effect
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introduces a non-monotonic relationship between productivity and firm-level markups: the
positive relationship between the two variables will be interrupted with an interval where
average markup decreases in productivity. The negative slope is explained by a composition
effect: as the productivity of exporting firms increase, they export an increasing share of
their production to the (more competitive) export market, and for some productivity values
this composition effect is stronger than the within-market positive relationship between
productivity and markups. As a result, exporting firms may have lower markups than
similar non-exporting firms.
Finally the model introduces a complementarity between importing and exporting. This
means that starting to import is more profitable when the firm also exports, thanks to the
larger market size. Also, starting to export is more profitable on the margin for firms which
also import thanks to the lower cost and higher quality associated with importing.
This logic leads to three cases in terms of productivity sorting. First, when the fixed cost
of importing is relatively low, the productivity threshold of importing is higher than that of
exporting. Second, when the cost of importing is high, the threshold of exporting is higher.
Complementarity however means that there is an intermediate set of parameter values when
the two thresholds are identical.
4.1 Demand
The basic structure of the model follows a partial equilibrium version of the model in An-
toniades (2015) and Yu (2013), which, in turn builds on Melitz and Ottaviano (2008). We
distinguish between two countries, domestic and foreign (D and F , respectively). We as-
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sume that the foreign country (the rest of the world) is larger than the home country, hence
LF > LD. The most important deviation from the Antoniades model is that of interpreta-
tion: the quality parameter, zi for firm i will be interpreted in our model as the share of
imported inputs.
The utility function of each consumer c is the following:
U = qc0 + α
∫
i∈Ω
(qci + zi) di−
1
2
γ
∫
i∈Ω
(qci − zi)2 di−
1
2
η
(∫
i∈Ω
(
qci −
1
2
zi
)
di
)2
, (6)
where qc0 and q
c
i are consumed quantities of the numeraire good and variety i (i ∈ Ω),
respectively, and α, γ and η are positive demand parameters.
This yields a linear market demand system for each variety i that is consumed in country
l (l = D,F ) (this set of products is denoted by Ω∗l ⊂ Ω):
qli ≡ Llqci =
αLl
ηN l + γ
− L
l
γ
pli + L
lzli +
ηN l
ηN l + γ
Ll
γ
pl − 1
2
ηN lLl
ηN l + γ
z¯l, l = D,F, (7)
where N l is the measure of consumed varieties, pl = (1/N l)
∫
i∈Ω∗l p
l
idi is their average price
and z¯l = (1/N l)
∫
i∈Ω∗l z
l
idi is the average import share of varieties sold in country l.
Consumers only consume products for which
pli ≤ γzli +
1
ηN l + γ
(γα + ηN lpl − γηN lz¯l) ≡ plmax(z), l = D,F, (8)
where plmax is the price where demand is driven to 0 for a product with z
l
i = 0.
The larger size of the foreign market implies both increased competition and higher
quality in the general equilibrium version of the Antoniades (2015) model, hence we also
assume that pF < pD. The larger market size also implies more entry, hence NF ≥ ND.
These assumptions are quite reasonable in our empirical investigation, in which we study a
small country with lower average quality level than in its main trade partners. According to
19
Equation (8) these assumptions imply that pFmax < p
D
max. Without much loss of generality
we also assume that the price difference is not extreme, pFmax > p
D
maxτ/2.
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4.2 Firm behavior
We look at firm behavior from the perspective of firms in the domestic economy. For simplic-
ity, the wage level is set to unity. The model is one of monopolistic competition: differentiated
goods producers take the average number of firms and prices as given.
Production exhibits constant returns to scale: each firm can produce one unit of output
at marginal cost c. c represents realizations of a random draw from a common distribution
G(c) as in Melitz and Ottaviano (2008). Importing includes sunk costs which include a
fixed part, f I , and a part increasing in import share, θz2i . Here, the novel element is the
f I . This is motivated by the very plausible entry costs of building capacity for importing
and finding foreign sellers and also by the robust observation that only a minority of firms
import directly. The convexity of the latter function can be motivated by the mechanism
described in Halpern, Koren and Szeidl (2011) that importing each kind of input requires
the same sunk cost, and firms first start to import their most important input followed by
inputs which play smaller and smaller role in their production process.14
13This assumption is only needed to guarantee that there is an increasing part (with respect to productiv-
ity) in the markup function of exporting firms. Otherwise it can happen that, for exporters, the competition
effect is always stronger than the markup increasing effect of productivity increase
14For tractability, we do not handle the constraint that import share cannot be larger than 1. Building in
this constraint would complicate the model but would not change the most important results.
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Under these assumptions, the cost function is the following:
TC =

cq if not importing
cq + f I + θz2 if importing
(9)
In what follows, we will study four trade modes: (i) no import or export (ii) import but
no export (iii) export but no import and (iv) both import and export.
TRADE MODE (i): NO TRADE. Let cD = pDmax be the cost level when such a firm
is indifferent between entering the market and exiting. In such a case, the price, quantity,
profit level and markup of the firm are:
pi(c) =
1
2
(cD + c) (10)
qi(c) =
LD
2γ
(cD − c) (11)
Πi(c) =
LD
4γ
(cD − c)2 (12)
µi(c) =
1
2
(cD − c) (13)
TRADE MODE (ii): ONLY IMPORT. With a given cost level and import share the
performance measures are:
pii(c, z) =
1
2
(cD + c) +
γ
2
z (14)
qii(c, z) =
LD
2γ
(cD − c) + L
D
2
z (15)
Πii(c, z) =
LD
4γ
(cD − c)2 + L
D
2
z(cD − c) + L
Dγ
4
z2 − θz2 − f I (16)
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Maximizing the profit function yields:
z∗(c) =
LD
4θ − LDγ (cD − c) (17)
To get a positive optimal import share (conditional on importing), we assume that 4θ >
(LD + LF )γ > LDγ. The optimality condition shows that more productive firms import
a higher share, hence supply higher quality goods. Also, firms import more inputs when
serving larger markets or when the differentiation between varieties, γ, is larger.
An important characteristic of this setting is that one can express the performance mea-
sures with the technology parameters:
pii(c) =
1
2
(cD + c) +
γLD
8θ − 2LDγ (cD − c) (18)
qii(c) =
LD
2γ
(cD − c) + (L
D)2
8θ − 2LDγ (cD − c) (19)
Πii(c) =
LD
4γ
(cD − c)2 + (L
D)2(cD − c)2
16θ − 4γLD − f
I (20)
µii(c) =
1
2
(cD − c) + γL
D(cD − c)
16θ − 4LD (21)
The performance measures behave differently in terms of productivity. As productivity
increases, prices may go up or down, depending on the relative importance of quality. Second,
quantity is increasing unambiguously with productivity. Third, profits are also increasing,
thanks to two channels: directly, higher productivity is associated with lower cost, and,
indirectly, higher productivity generates more imports. Finally, the markup level linearly
increases in productivity reflecting both the direct and the indirect channel.
TRADE MODE (iii): ONLY EXPORT. When exporting, firms pay iceberg-type trans-
portation costs, τ > 1, and so the unit cost of delivering becomes τc. Let cF = pFmax/τ
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denote the cost level of firms who are indifferent to entering the foreign market, given no
imports. Since pDmax > p
F
max and τ > 1, c
D > cF .
The price and quantity in the foreign market is given by:
pF (c) =
τ
2
(cF + c) (22)
q(c) =
LD
2γ
(cD − c) + L
F
2γ
τ(cF − c) (23)
The total profit level of such a firm is the sum of profits in the domestic and foreign
markets:
Πiii(c) =
LD
4γ
(cD − c)2 + L
F
4γ
τ 2(cF − c)2 (24)
The firm-level markup is the quantity-weighted average of its markups in the two markets:
µiii(c) =
LD(cD − c)2 + LF τ 2(cF − c)2
2LD(cD − c) + 2LF τ(cF − c) (25)
The performance measures behave as expected with the exception of the markup measure.
This measure is a weighted average of the markups on the two markets. While markup
increases linearly on the two markets, the composition effect can lead to an interval when
the markup actually decreases. We will return to this question.
TRADE MODE (iv): TWO-WAY TRADE. As we have discussed, we will deviate from
Antoniades (2015) in allowing firms to pay the fixed cost of importing only once, which
authorizes them to produce with the same import intensity in both markets. Antoniades
assumes that firms have to pay the quadratic fixed costs on both markets which makes the
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model more tractable, but it is less realistic in our setting. Note, however, that our main
predictions are robust to the setting chosen by Antoniades (2015).
The profit function for this mode is:
Πiv(c) =
LD
4γ
(cD − c)2+L
F
4γ
τ 2 (cF − c)2+
[
LD
2
(cD − c) + L
F τ
2
(cF − c)
]
z+
(γ
4
LD +
γ
4
LF − θ
)
z2−f I
(26)
Differentiating the profit function with respect to z yields:
z∗ =
LD (cD − c) + LF τ (cF − c)
4θ − γ (LD + LF ) (27)
Note that optimal import share is increasing in productivity. Also, a firm choosing trade
mode (iv) invests more into importing inputs than a firm choosing mode (ii), ceteris paribus,
since the firm takes into account the benefits from both markets which is reflected in the
smaller denominator in this formula. Plugging in the optimal share yields:
Πiv(c) =
LD
4γ
(cD − c)2 + L
F
4γ
τ 2 (cF − c)2 + 1
4
[
LD (cD − c) + LF τ (cF − c)
]2
4θ − γ (LD + LF ) − f
I (28)
Similarly to mode (ii), the profit from this mode is also increasing in productivity both
through the direct channel of lower costs and the indirect channel of higher export intensity.
Using the previous notation we can express the firm-level average markup:
µiv(c) =
LD(cD − c)2 + LF τ 2(cF − c)2 + [2γLD(cD − c) + 2γLF τ(cF − c)]z∗ + (γ2LD + γ2LF )(z∗)2
2LD(cD − c) + 2LF τ(cF − c) + (2LDγ + 2LFγ)z∗
(29)
Plugging in z∗ and after some algebra one can show that µiv is a modified version of µiii:
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µiv(c) =
4θ + γ
(
LD + LF
)
4θ − γ (LD + LF )µ
iii(c)+γ
LD (cD − c) + LF τ (cF − c)
4θ − γ (LD + LF ) −
γ
2
LD + LF
4θ + γ (LD + LF )
(30)
The markup function is steeper with respect to unit cost than µiii thanks to the increase
in import share when c decreases.
4.3 Sorting and markup patterns
The model yields sorting patterns which depend on the relative costs and benefits of im-
porting and exporting. In particular, what matters is the threshold between modes (i) and
(ii), which shows the relative cost and attractiveness of importing. When importing is very
costly, firms will first start to export followed by two-way trade as their unit cost decreases.
We will call this the case of “easy export”. Second, when importing is relatively cheap, the
sorting pattern is importing followed by two-way trade. We will call this case “easy import”.
Finally, for intermediate values of the threshold firms will start importing and exporting at
the same threshold, called the case of “complementarity”.
Naturally, firms will not enter the market whenever c > cD, as in the original Melitz-
Ottaviano model. Note that when c = cD, only trade mode (i) yields a non-negative profit,
modes involving importing are associated with strictly negative profits. Hence, given that
f I > 0, the threshold cost level for no trade is higher than that of any other trade mode.
The crucial measure for sorting is the threshold between modes (i) and (ii), when Πi = Πii.
This threshold is the following:
c˘ = cD −
√
f I (4θ − γLD)
LD
(31)
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Another measure is the threshold when exporting becomes profitable. As in Melitz and
Ottaviano (2008) it is at c = cF when the firm does not import. When importing, however,
the quality of the product is higher, so consumers will buy the product even at a higher
choke price. From the demand function and the optimal investment into import the choke
price for exporting when also importing is: c = 4θ−γL
D
4θ−γLD+1cF +
γLD
4θ−γLD+1cD. Intuitively, it is
a weighted average of the domestic and (non-importing) foreign threshold.15
The three cases are the following. First, in the “easy export” case c˘ is lower than cF ,
hence firms start to export first followed by importing. Second, we have “easy import” when
c˘ is so high, that at c˘ exporting is not profitable even when importing. Finally, when c˘
is between these two intermediate values, the threshold for importing and exporting is the
same.
1. “easy export”: c˘ < cF
In this case, exporting is easy relative to importing. As a result, the sorting pattern will
be mode (i), (iii) and (iv). Naturally, the threshold between modes (i) and (iii) is cF . We
have to calculate the threshold between mode (iii) and (iv), which we will denote with c¯.
c¯ ≡
√
4
3
f I [4θ − γ (LD + LF )] + LDcD + LF τcF
LD + τLF
(32)
Note that choosing trade mode (ii) is never optimal is this case, because firms have to pay
the same amount for importing independently from their export status, and the benefit from
importing is larger when the firm already exports. One can write up the average markup as
a function of productivity:
15Note that at the threshold exported quantity is zero, hence the optimal import share is that of TRADE
MODE (ii).
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µ(c) =

1
2
(cD − c) if cF < c ≤ cD
LD(cD−c)2+LF τ2(cF−c)2
2LD(cD−c)+2LF τ(cF−c) if c¯ < c ≤ cF
µiv(c) if c ≤ c¯
(33)
Figure 2: Firm markup as function of marginal cost
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A typical example for this function is shown in Figure 2 when f I is set to 1500. The
parameter values in the figure are set at cD = 80, L
D = 50, LF = 250, γ = 4, θ = 1000,
τ = 1.2. Let us consider how the markup changes as productivity increases (marginal cost
decreases). First, for firms without import and export, the markup is a linear function
of productivity. Second, as the firm starts to export, the average markup decreases on
some interval because of the composition effect from the more competitive market. The
decreasing interval is followed by an increasing part when the markup-increasing effect of
higher productivity becomes stronger than the composition effect. All in all, the markup
function follows a U-shaped pattern between c = 0 and c = cF .
16
16Under our assumptions, this is always the case. The numerator of the derivative of µiii(c) is
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Starting to import also has two counterbalancing effects. First, starting to import in-
creases the quality of the product, hence it is associated with higher markups. Second, when
importing, it is optimal for the firm to export more. This leads to the composition effect
coming from the lower markups in the export market. The net effect of importing depends
on the distance between the thresholds for exporting and importing. If the two are close to
each other, hence c¯ is on the increasing part of µiii(c),17 the composition effect may domi-
nate, while otherwise starting to import is associated with a positive jump in the markup
function (shown on Figure 2).
Figure 3 shows how the U-shape pattern of the markup function varies with the toughness
of competition on the foreign market. Fiercer competition (lower cF ) enables only the more
productive firms to enter the export market and, after entering, the fall of the firm markup[−2(LD)2 + 2LDLF τ] (cD − c)2 + [−2(LF )2τ3 + 2LDLF τ2] (cF − c)2 − 4LDLF τ(1 + τ)(cD − c)(cF − c).
This can be rewritten as µiii
′
(c) = −2 (LD + LF τ) (LD + LF τ2) c2 + 4 (LDcD + LF τcF ) (LD + LF τ2) c −
2
[(
LDcD + L
F τcF
) (
LDcD + L
F τ2cF
)− LDLF τ (cD − cF ) (cD − τcF )]. We will prove that this quadratic
function is increasing from a negative value at c = 0 to a positive value at c = cF , and hence, the
markup function is U-shaped in this interval. Plugging in c = 0 yields negative number under our as-
sumption that pFmax > p
D
maxτ/2. Plugging in c = cF yields a positive derivative because under our
assumption that LF > LD, −2(LF )2τ3 + 2LDLF τ2 > 0 in the first form of the derivative. Finally,
one can calculate the roots of the derivative function. This takes the form c1,2 =
LDcD+LF τcF
LD+LF τ
±√
(LDcD+LF τcF )2
(LD+LF τ)2
− (LDcD+LF τcF )(LDcD+LF τ2cF )−LDLF τ(cD−cF )(cD−τcF )
(LD+LF τ)(LD+LF τ2)
. The first term is a weighted av-
erage of cD and cF , so it is larger than cF . This means that the second root is also larger than cF , hence
only the first root can be within [0, cF ] interval. The fact that the derivative function takes a negative value
at the lower end of the interval and a positive on the upper end implies that the first root is within this
interval. All in all, the µiii(c) function is U-shaped in the interval with a minimum.
17More precisely, the dividing point is where µiii(c) = µiv(c).
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due to the composition effect is larger than on less competitive foreign markets.
Figure 3: Firm markup and export market competition
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2. “easy import”: 4θ−γL
D
4θ−γLD+1cF +
γLD
4θ−γLD+1cD < c˘
In this case the cost structure of exporting is more demanding than that of importing.
Hence firms start to import first and switch to two-way trade only with higher productivity
levels. The threshold for this, Πii = Πiv will be denoted by cˆ. This is the cost level where
the exported quantity is equal to zero when the positive import share is taken into account :
cˆ ≡ 4θ − γL
D
4θ − γLD + 1cF +
γLD
4θ − γLD + 1cD (34)
Note that this threshold is larger than the threshold in the “easy export” case and the
Melitz-Ottaviano model thanks to the demand increasing effect of higher quality. Hence,
importing firms enter the export market earlier because of the complementarity between
importing and exporting.
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The function of markups take the following form:
µ(c) =

1
2
(cD − c) if
√
fI(4θ−γLD)
LD
< c ≤ cD
1
2
(cD − c) + γLD16θ−4LDγ (cD − c) if cˆ < c ≤
√
fI(4θ−γLD)
LD
µiv(c) if c ≤ cˆ
(35)
A typical such function is shown in Figure 2 with parameter f I = 100. Again, the markup
of non-trading firms is linearly increasing in productivity. When firms start to import, their
markup jumps and the function becomes steeper. Finally, starting to export exhibits the
negative interval thanks to the composition effect followed by another increasing part.18
3. “complementarity”: cF ≤ c˘ ≤ 4θ−γLD4θ−γLD+1cF + γL
D
4θ−γLD+1cD
In the third case importing and exporting have the same threshold, because c˘ is between
the choke price with and without importing. Hence, as soon as the firm finds it optimal to
start importing, Πiv ≥ Πi, it also starts to export.
Note that the measure of this set is non-zero thanks to the complementarity: there is an
interval of parameter values where firms switch from no trade to two-way trade immediately
thanks to the complementarity of exporting and importing.
The threshold is where Πi = Πiv, which we will denote with ~c.19 The markup function is
18This is again always the case under our assumptions, because µiv(c) behaves very similarly to µiii(c).
The derivative function of µiv(c) is proportional to µiii
′
(c)−γ[4θ−γ(LD+LS)](LD+τLF ). Consequently it
is also a concave parabola with a negative value at c = 0 and a positive one at 4θ−γL
D
4θ−γLD+1cF , hence the markup
function is again U-shaped in the relevant interval. The difference between the two derivative functions is
a decreasing linear function. This means that the downward-sloping part of µiv(c) is steeper than that of
µiii(c), hence increasing productivity leads to a larger increase in the markup of two-way traders than that
of only exporters. Also, the minimum of µiv(c) is at higher cost level than the minimum of µiii(c).
19~c = 2L
FMτ2cF+2γ(L
D+LF )(LDcD+L
F cF )
2LFMτ2+2γ(LD+LF )2
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the following:
µ(c) =

1
2
(cD − c) if c ≤ cD
µiv(c) if c ≤ ~c
(36)
4.4 Empirical predictions
• Unconditionally, importers should have higher markups than non-importers both be-
cause of the selection effect and the markup increasing effect of higher quality. This is
true in all three cases with the partial exception of close thresholds for exporting and
importing in the “easy import” case. This part of the parameter space does not seem
to be large enough to counter the strong positive association between importing and
markups in all other cases.
• Unconditionally, exporters may or may not have higher markups than non-exporters.
The ambiguity comes from the countervailing forces of selection and the composition
effect. The composition effect may be stronger in all three cases on the increasing part
of the markup function.
• Conditioning on productivity importers should have higher markups than non-importers.
The difference should be smaller than in the unconditional case. To see this, we may
compare two firms with different f Is. The one with larger fixed cost starts importing
later, and has a lower markup in the interval between the two thresholds. Again this
prediction should be qualified by the partial exception in the “easy import” case.
−
√
(2LFMτ2cF+2γ(LD+LF )(LDcD+LF cF ))
2−4(LFMτ2+γ(LD+LF )2)(LFMτ2(LF )2+γ(LDcD+LF cF )2−4γMfI)
2LFMτ2+2γ(LD+LF )2
where
M = 4θ − γ (LD + LF ).
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• Conditioning on productivity, exporters may have higher or lower markup than non-
exporters. The premium should be lower than the unconditional premium.
• Ceteris paribus, larger import intensity is associated with higher markups thanks to
the larger share of quality-enhancing inputs. Higher export intensity may be associated
with smaller markups because it means that a larger share of the firm’s output is sold
on the more competitive market.
• Exporting and importing are supermodular: ceteris paribus, exporters have a lower
productivity threshold for importing and vice versa.
5 Empirical results
In what follows we look at empirically how the firm markup varies with trading status.
Unless otherwise noted we use the markup and productivity estimates from the value added
Translog production function. Later we show that the results are qualitatively the same for
the alternative markup and TFP estimates.
5.1 Within-industry evidence
We first look at how the markup of firms similar in size and ownership varies with the trading
status within industry-year groups. We run the following regression equation
lnµit = γ
exDexit + γ
imDimit + γ
xXit + δkt + εit, (37)
where lnµit on the left-hand side is the logarithm of markup of firm i (operating in industry
k) and year t. On the right-hand side Dexit and D
im
it are dummies for the exporting and
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importing status, respectively. Exporter is a firm-year with positive export sales, importer
is a firm-year with positive material imports.20 Other firm-specific explanatory variables
(size, ownership) are in Xit, δkt denotes the full set of industry-year dummies and εit is
the idiosyncratic error term. Firms are classified into 22 two-digit manufacturing (NACE)
industries.
Table 3: Markup and productivity premium estimates
Dependent variable: log markup log TFP
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
exporter 0.071*** 0.016 -0.005 -0.002 0.156*** 0.062**
(0.020) (0.016) (0.013) (0.012) (0.025) (0.024)
importer 0.136*** 0.070*** 0.061*** 0.237***
(0.017) (0.019) (0.019) (0.021)
foreign 0.094*** 0.067*** 0.046*** 0.004 0.132*** 0.052
(0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.045) (0.032) (0.083)
exporter * foreign -0.032 -0.057
(0.041) (0.065)
importer * foreign 0.083*** 0.092**
(0.024) (0.042)
log TFP(-1) 0.293*** 0.292***
(0.023) (0.023)
Size dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes
Industry-year dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes
Observations 31,333 31,333 22,651 22,651 31,333 31,333
R-squared 0.413 0.423 0.456 0.456 0.700 0.721
Notes: Markup and TFP are estimated from a value added Translog production function following De Loecker and
Warzynski (2012). Size dummies are defined on the number of employees (between 5 and 20, between 20 and 100, above
100). Industry-year fixed effects are with two-digit industries. Robust standard errors with two-digit industry clusters
are in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
We estimate a positive and significant markup premium for exporters (column 1) only
as long as we do not control for the importer status and past productivity. Exporting firms
20To avoid classifying small irregular cross-border transactions as genuine foreign trade we disregard ex-
ports and imports of individual firms in a given year and 6-digit product under HUF 100,000 (ca. US$ 500
according to the sample period average exchange rate).
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charge roughly 7% higher markups, on average, than firms of similar size and ownership that
sell only domestically in a given industry and year. This estimated premium is, however,
largely due to the fact that most exporters use imported intermediate inputs, and importing
firms charge significantly higher markups than non-importers. If we control for the import-
ing status, we get an importer markup premium of 14%, while the exporter premium falls
below 2%, and becomes statistically insignificant (column 2). This is much in line with our
predictions that importing is strongly positively associated with markups thanks both to se-
lection and higher quality generated from imports, while in the case of exporting the positive
self-selection may be counterbalanced by the stronger competition in export markets.
If we control for the past productivity level of the firm (column 3), the exporter premium
falls to zero and the importer premium roughly halves. This supports the idea that trading
firms charge higher markups (at least partly) because they are also more productive.21 The
fact that productivity differences do not explain the importer premium fully suggests that
imports generate other advantages, most likely the quality advantage proposed in our model.
The exporter markup premium falls close to zero irrespective of the ownership status
of the firm. In column (4) we interact the trading status dummies with the foreign own-
ership dummy and find that the estimated markup premium for foreign-owned exporters is
statistically not different from the estimate for domestically owned exporters. In contrast,
importing materials associates with a significantly higher markup premium for foreign-owned
firms than for domestic ones. This suggests that foreign-owned producers may face lower
costs of importing and/or make better use of the imported materials. These may partly
21It is not the change in the sample size that causes the change in the coefficient estimates. Reproducing
regressions (1)–(2) on the shorter sample yields qualitatively the same results as on the whole sample.
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be explained by better access to international production networks and partly by possible
complementarities between imported materials and other production factors (technology and
worker or managerial sills).
In the last two columns of Table 3 we report estimates for the productivity premium of
trading firms. The regression equation is similar to (37) but with the logarithm of TFP on
the left-hand side. We find significantly positive productivity premia for both exporting and
importing. The especially large importer premium estimate can reflect both a large selection
effect and that importing leads to better firm performance, such as higher productivity
or product quality. It is important to note here that our TFP estimate captures revenue
productivity, which differs from pure physical efficiency in that it likely also reflects firm
heterogeneity in demand-side effects, pricing strategies or factor input prices.22 Hence, beside
higher physical productivity, the importer premium we estimate may as well reflect importers’
higher profitability in general.
Next we look at the relationship between the firm markup and the intensity of trade. We
again estimate equation (37), but now, in addition to the exporter and importer dummies we
also include the intensity variables. We define export intensity as the share of export sales in
total sales and import intensity as the share of imported materials in the total expenditure
on material inputs.
According to our model framework, for a given productivity level, a larger export intensity
associates with a lower firm markup simply because a larger share of sales is destined to the
more competitive foreign market. A larger import intensity however should coincide with a
22See De Loecker and Goldberg (2013) for a recent summary and discussion on the differences between
revenue and physical TFP estimates.
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higher markup both conditional on productivity and unconditionally.
Table 4: Markup premium with export and import intensities
Dependent variable: log markup
full sample domestic firms
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
exporter 0.031 0.002 0.043** 0.018
(0.018) (0.015) (0.017) (0.014)
export intensity -0.100*** -0.052 -0.112*** -0.082**
(0.034) (0.034) (0.039) (0.037)
export intensity in Q1 0.030 0.043**
(0.020) (0.019)
export intensity in Q2 -0.012 -0.004
(0.013) (0.014)
export intensity in Q3 -0.050*** -0.028*
(0.015) (0.016)
export intensity in Q4 -0.024 -0.022
(0.021) (0.021)
importer 0.116*** 0.057*** 0.120*** 0.064***
(0.016) (0.018) (0.018) (0.020)
import intensity 0.154*** 0.110*** 0.138*** 0.097***
(0.028) (0.030) (0.030) (0.028)
import intensity in Q1 0.061*** 0.072***
(0.022) (0.018)
import intensity in Q2 0.066*** 0.066***
(0.020) (0.021)
import intensity in Q3 0.081** 0.083**
(0.035) (0.035)
import intensity in Q4 0.126*** 0.123***
(0.025) (0.022)
foreign 0.058*** 0.038*** 0.039***
(0.014) (0.011) (0.011)
log TFP(-1) 0.287*** 0.285*** 0.291*** 0.289***
(0.023) (0.022) (0.027) (0.027)
size dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes
industry-year dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes
Observations 31,333 22,651 22,651 24,218 17,416 17,416
R-squared 0.426 0.457 0.458 0.456 0.478 0.479
Notes: Markup and TFP are estimated from a value added Translog production function following De Loecker and
Warzynski (2012). Size dummies are defined on the number of employees (between 5 and 20, between 20 and 100, above
100). Industry-year fixed effects are with two-digit industries. Robust standard errors with two-digit industry clusters
are in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Our model predictions find strong empirical support in Table 4, where we report results
both for the full sample and for domestically owned firms only. The markup of firms is
found smaller the larger the export intensity is, which is supportive for the composition
effect, namely that the average firm markup falls if a larger share of sales goes to the foreign
market. This finding holds both with and without controlling for past productivity, although
the full sample estimate in column 2 is not significantly different from zero. We also find
that markup increases strongly in import intensity, again both with and without controlling
for past productivity. A firm which sources all of its inputs from abroad charges roughly
10% higher markup than an equally productive firm which buys almost all of its inputs
domestically.
In columns 3 and 6 of Table 4 we investigate the possible presence of a non-linear relation-
ship between markup and the trade intensities and replace the exporter and importer status
and intensity variables with four-four dummy variables that indicate which quartile of the
export and import intensity distribution the firm belongs to. We expect that, after control-
ling for productivity, firms falling into higher export (import) quartiles charge increasingly
lower (higher) markups.
As for exporting, our expectation seems to hold true up to the third quartile, where the
negative association between the export intensity and the markup is the strongest. In the
fourth quartile, i.e. for firms with 75%-100% of export intensity, the coefficient estimate gets
smaller in magnitude. This non-linear pattern can only partly be explained by the large
share of multinationals in the fourth export quartile, since it is also present - although less
strongly - among domestically owned firms.
As for importing, we find strongly significant positive markup premia in all the four
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quartiles. In line with our expectations, the point estimates increase in magnitude gradually
(from 6 to 12 per cent) toward the higher end of the import intensity distribution. Importers
charge higher markup than non-importers, and the more of their intermediate inputs they
import, the higher their markup premium is.
5.2 Markup and export destination
An important feature of our model is the asymmetry in the toughness of competition between
the home and the foreign economy. Firms in the home country charge lower markups on
the export market than domestically, because the foreign market is bigger and hence more
competitive than the domestic one.
Next we look at how the markup vary with the type of the export destination. Our
hypothesis is that Hungarian firms exporting to large developed markets such as the EU15
(European Union before 2004) and the US face tougher competition than firms exporting
to other less developed, and probably more fragmented, markets. As a result, the exporter
markup premium should be smaller (or more negative) for the former than for the latter
group of firms.
We estimate (37) adding an additional variable that measures what share of a firm’s
exports is directed to developed markets. Mainly for robustness, we also add a similar
developed share variable for imports. Our group of developed countries include the EU15
countries, the four EFTA members (Iceland, Norway, Switzerland, Liechtenstein) as well as
Australia, Canada, Israel, Japan, New Zealand, South Korea and the US. The median firm
in our database sends roughly 95% of its exports to this group of countries. The results are
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robust to restricting the developed group to the EU15 and the US, where our median firm
sends 85% of its exports.
Table 5: Markup premium and the foreign market
Dependent variable: log markup
full sample domestic firms
(1) (2)
exporter 0.044*** 0.045***
(0.015) (0.014)
export intensity -0.014 -0.056
(0.036) (0.040)
developed share in exports -0.079*** -0.052***
(0.013) (0.014)
importer 0.047* 0.057*
(0.027) (0.027)
import intensity 0.107*** 0.094***
(0.030) (0.028)
developed share in imports 0.013 0.010
(0.020) (0.016)
foreign yes no
log TFP(-1) yes yes
Size dummies yes yes
Industry-year dummies yes yes
Observations 22,651 17,416
R-squared 0.459 0.479
Notes: Markup is estimated from a value added Translog production func-
tion following De Loecker and Warzynski (2012). Size dummies are de-
fined on the number of employees (between 5 and 20, between 20 and 100,
above 100). Industry-year fixed effects are with two-digit industries. Ro-
bust standard errors with two-digit industry clusters are in parentheses.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 5 reports the results for the full sample and for domestically owned firms only. The
estimates clearly give support to our hypothesis. The share of developed markets among
export destinations strongly negatively correlates with the firm markup conditional on all
other observables. The finding is especially strong on the full sample, which also includes
foreign-owned firms. According to these estimates, exporting in general, which is captured
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by the exporter dummy, associates with significantly larger markup. This markup premium
however rapidly falls with the share of developed markets in exports. At the extreme, firms
exporting exclusively to developed markets may have negative markup premia.
We find no evidence that the importer markup premium would vary across developed and
less developed source countries. The coefficient estimate for the developed share in imports
variable is statistically not different from zero, though positive.
We also look at the relationship between export intensity and firm markup by selected
individual developed countries (Table 10 in Appendix). The coefficient estimates are neg-
ative – though not always statistically significant – for almost all important EU15 trading
partners and the US. The results are qualitatively similar, though weaker in significance, for
domestically owned firms. The estimates are typically larger in magnitude on the full sample
and especially so for some smaller countries, notably Ireland. Against this background we
cannot rule out that tax optimization of multinationals through transfer pricing might drive
some of our full sample results.
5.3 Markup and quality
Our model suggests that imports lead to higher output quality and hence an importer markup
premium. The evidence that the importer markup premium does not vary with the source
country’s level of development is somewhat at odds with this hypothesis, because one would
expect that imports from more developed countries can foster quality improvement better
than imports from less developed economies. A possible explanation is that not all types of
imported goods matter for output quality. Some inputs are relatively homogeneous and do
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not matter much for the output quality, while others - notably differentiated goods with a
wide range of available varieties - can make large differences in the quality of output. We
identify the imported inputs of each firm which are differentiated goods according to the
(liberal) classification of Rauch (1999) and will look at how the markup of firms varies with
the share of differentiated goods in the firm’s total imports of intermediate inputs.
Next, it is reasonable to assume that imports raise output quality only if the imported
input itself is also of high quality. Hence, we should observe firms which import higher
quality inputs charging higher markup. To explore this we proxy high-quality imports with
the unit value of the imported input. We observe unit values by 6-digit product, firm and
year as the value of imports divided by the quantity of imports (in kilogram). We look at
how these firm-product unit values deviate from the unit value of the same product imported
to the EU-15 as a whole in the same year.23 If, in a year, the ratio of the former to the
latter, which we call ‘import unit value ratio’, is higher than its sample average across firms,
we define the firm-product import as high quality.
In Table 6 we report regression estimates with the differentiated goods share and the
high-quality share variables, both of which - as expected - associate positively with the
markup variable. Firms importing only differentiated goods or only higher quality goods,
as measured by the unit value, charge roughly 4% higher markup than similar firms which
import only non-differentiated or lower quality inputs.
We can also ask whether importing intermediate inputs leads to higher-quality export
products, where we again proxy the quality of an export product by its unit value. On a
detailed panel of exporting firms by 6-digit product and destination country we regress the
23Data on the value and quantity of imports of the European Union is sourced from Eurostat.
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Table 6: Markup premium and type of imports
Dependent variable: log markup
(1) (2) (3)
exporter 0.002 0.002 0.003
(0.015) (0.015) (0.015)
export intensity -0.052 -0.052 -0.052
(0.035) (0.034) (0.035)
importer 0.031 0.048*** 0.025
(0.021) (0.016) (0.019)
import intensity 0.114*** 0.115*** 0.118***
(0.030) (0.030) (0.030)
differentiated share in imports 0.043*** 0.040**
(0.014) (0.015)
high-quality share in imports 0.039* 0.034*
(0.019) (0.020)
foreign yes yes yes
log TFP(-1) yes yes yes
Size dummies yes yes yes
Industry-year dummies yes yes yes
Observations 22,651 22,651 22,651
R-squared 0.458 0.457 0.458
Notes: Markup is estimated from a value added Translog production function follow-
ing De Loecker and Warzynski (2012). Size dummies are defined on the number of
employees (between 5 and 20, between 20 and 100, above 100). Industry-year fixed
effects are with two-digit industries. Robust standard errors with two-digit industry
clusters are in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
logarithm of the export unit value on, among other regressors, a firm-specific dummy for
importing and a dummy for importing high-quality inputs. High-quality importers are firms
whose import unit value ratio (average across products, weighted by quantity) is above the
median across firms. At this level of aggregation the sample includes 315,851 observations
with 7,214 firms exporting 4,153 products to 211 destinations in 9 years.
Results are shown in Table 7, where we report two types of estimates: one with product-
year and destination dummies in the first two columns and one with firm-year, destination
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and two-digit product dummies in the last two columns.24 The estimates show that exporters
who also import (i.e. two-way traders) sell products abroad with a significantly higher unit
value than exporters who source their materials only domestically, and that this pattern
is clearly driven by high-quality importing. Moreover, what we find is not merely a cross
sectional relationship but is also present within the firm, albeit with smaller point estimates
(columns 3 and 4).
Table 7: Export unit value and importing
Dependent variable: log export unit value
(1) (2) (3) (4)
importer 0.057*** -0.080*** 0.026** 0.013
(0.016) (0.017) (0.013) (0.014)
high-quality importer 0.320*** 0.029***
(0.013) (0.011)
foreign yes yes
size dummies yes yes
firm-year dummies yes yes
product-year dummies yes yes
two-digit product dummies yes yes
destination dummies yes yes yes yes
Observations 315,851 315,851 315,851 315,851
R-squared 0.802 0.806 0.782 0.782
Notes: Dependent variable is log export unit value by firm, destination country, product
and year. Firm size dummies are defined on the number of employees (between 5 and 20,
between 20 and 100, above 100). Clustered robust standard errors with firm-year clusters
are in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
24Coefficient standard errors are clustered by firm-year in all estimations, but the results are robust to
alternative levels of clustering (e.g. firm, destination, firm-product, product-year).
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5.4 Markup and starting to trade
In this section we ask how the markup behaves as the firm starts to trade. We compare
the markup of firms that started to export or import materials with firms that never traded
during the sample period. Hence, we always exclude firms from the sample that were traders
throughout the whole sample period.
We estimate how the markup of individual firms change as the trading status of the firm
changes with the firm fixed-effects regression,
lnµit = γ
exDexit + γ
imDimit + γ
xXit + δi + δt + εit, (38)
where δi are firm fixed effects and δt are common year dummies. Unlike the within-industry-
year estimates in the previous section, the fixed effects estimation identifies the effect of
trading from the changes of firm markups over time.
The results are shown in Table 8 for two samples, the latter excluding firm-year observa-
tions after the firm stops exporting or importing (exits). Regardless of the estimation sample
we find no significant change in the firm markup as a result of starting to export, while we
find clear evidence for an increase in the markup (of around 3%) after the firm starts to
import materials.
Next we carry out a within-firm event study to look at how the markup premium evolves
years before and after a firm starts to trade. Again we estimate (38) but replace the single
exporter and importer dummies with dummies specific to the event year, s, i.e. the number
of years before or after the firm starts to trade. We define a four-year event window and
choose the year preceding the trade entry as the reference year.25 This means that we include
25We classify the few observations five and more years away from the year of starting to trade in the -4
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Table 8: Markup and starting to trade - within-firm estimates
Dependent variable: log markup
sample without
sample without always traders
always traders and firms after exit
(1) (2)
exporter 0.014 -0.003
(0.013) (0.024)
importer 0.032** 0.033*
(0.012) (0.019)
foreign -0.021 -0.033
(0.030) (0.041)
Size dummies yes yes
Firm dummies yes yes
Year dummies yes yes
Observations 15,878 12,347
R-squared 0.897 0.915
Notes: Markup is estimated from a value added Translog production
function following De Loecker and Warzynski (2012). We exclude
firms that always export or import. Size dummies are defined on the
number of employees (between 5 and 20, between 20 and 100, above
100). Robust standard errors with two-digit industry clusters are in
parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
exporter and importer dummies for event years s ∈ (-4,-3,-2,0,1,2,3,4). Importantly, to avoid
overlapping event windows, we estimate on the sample that excludes firm-year observations
after trade exits.
Figure 4 in the Appendix plots the estimated exporter and importer markups against
the event years, relative to event year −1, which is normalized to zero. The evolution of
the markup line from year 0 indicates the effect of trading on the firm markup (in log).
The important finding here is the declining path of the markup after the first (full) year of
exporting, as compared to its relatively stable pre-entry pattern. This decline is not visible
from the simple fixed-effects estimation in Table 8 column 2, because observations for higher
and 4 event year categories.
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event years are relatively few.
Finally, the graph for importing shows that the firm markup increases already in the year
of starting to import (year 0) and remains above its average pre-entry level in later years.
6 Robustness
As robustness checks we reproduce our main estimation results for two alternative markup
estimates, also reported in Table 9, and two modified sample periods. In short, our results
are robust to these changes.
Alternative markup estimates. We take the markup estimates based on two different
production function specifications: the Cobb-Douglas production function on the value added
(VA-CD) and the Translog production function on gross output (GO-TL).
The Cobb-Douglas production function is a special case of equation (2), where the param-
eters of the quadratic and interaction terms are set to zero. The estimated output elasticity
of labor is then constant across firms in the same industry and year and, hence, all firm-level
variation in the estimated markup comes from the revenue share of labor.
The Translog production function on the gross output is a modified version of equation
(2), where yit is the logarithm of gross output of firm i in year t and the right-hand side
also includes the terms with the material input, m (in log), βmmit + βmmm
2
it + βlmlitmit +
βkmkitmit + βlkmlitkitmit. This production function is more flexible than our baseline spec-
ification, which implicitly assumes that materials are used in fixed proportion with gross
output. It also enables us to obtain markup estimates from two variable inputs by applying
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equation (1) to either labor or materials.
We report the sample median, mean and coefficient of variation of the baseline and the
alternative markup estimates in Table 9.26
Our GO-TL markup is a composite estimate, because we obtain it by taking the geometric
mean of the labor-based and material-based markup estimates. We do this in order to correct
for a possible measurement issue in the labor and material input variables. Outsourcing in-
house services or parts of the production process to independent suppliers, which was a
common practice in the period among Hungarian firms, shows up in the data as substitution
of materials for labor. This leads to decreasing labor and increasing material revenue shares
and, in turn, increasing labor-based and decreasing material-based markup estimates. We
let the two trends offset each other in the geometric mean.
Table 9: Alternative markup estimates
Specification median mean CV
Value added Translog (VA-TL) 1.53 1.79 0.56
Value added Cobb-Douglas (VA-CD) 1.76 2.12 0.61
Gross output Translog (GO-TL) 1.26 1.37 0.34
Notes: CV (coefficient of variation) is standard deviation over the mean. The
GO-TL markup is the geometric mean of the labor-based and material-based
GO-TL markup estimates.
The median markup estimates take reasonable values, but differ considerably across spec-
ifications. The markup estimate from a value added Cobb-Douglas (VA-CD) production
function is higher (76%), while that from a gross output Translog (GO-TL) production
function is clearly lower (26%) than our baseline estimate. The lower end of the reported
estimates is comparable to the markup estimates of De Loecker and Warzynski (2012) for
26We clean the markup estimates from outliers below zero or above 10. Occurrence of outliers is low, not
exceeding half a per cent of the observations, for all types of estimates.
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Slovenian firms during 1994-2000 and to those of De Loecker, Goldberg, Khandelwal and
Pavcnik (2012) for India during 1989-2003.
Despite the differences in levels our baseline markup and the VA-CD and GO-TL markups
are strongly positively correlated. The pairwise correlation coefficients of the markups (in
logs) within industry and year are in the range of 0.7–0.9.
Finally, Table 11 shows the regression estimation results, which reproduce our baseline
estimates in Table 3 columns (2) and (4) and Table 4 columns (1) and (2) on the alternative
markups. Importantly, our main findings on the large importer markup premium and the
non-existent exporter markup premium remain remarkably robust. The findings on the trade
intensities and the role of foreign ownership are also reinforced.
Different sample periods. Next we check the robustness of our findings to varying the
sample period. During the 1990s, and especially in the early years, Hungary was better
characterized as a transition economy with episodes of mass privatization and market lib-
eralization as well as opening up to trade with “Western” markets. Also, before 1995 the
Hungarian currency was repeatedly subject to large devaluations. Our baseline sample pe-
riod is 1995-2003, hence it excludes the most turbulent years of transition.
As a robustness check we replicate our results on the period of 1992-2003, which extends
to the early years of transition, and on the shorter period of 1998-2003. We report the
estimates in Table 12. Again, our main results remain remarkably robust, also concerning
the magnitude of the estimates.
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7 Conclusion
This paper has studied how importing and exporting is related to firm-level markups. In
the theoretical part of the paper we have provided a model which takes into account the
role of self-selection based on productivity, the potentially different degree of competition in
different markets and the role of importing in providing access to higher quality inputs. For
this, we use a variable markups framework in which importers have to pay a fixed cost but
can produce higher quality goods which can be sold for a higher markup. Such a framework
emphasizes that markups are not only determined by productivity differences, but also by
differences in competition and quality.
The main message and prediction of the model is that while self-selection based on
productivity implies a positive relationship between trade and markups, other factors may
modify this relationship. In the case of importing, the potentially higher quality of imports
may amplify the positive relationship. When exporting is considered, however, stronger
competition on export markets may counterbalance self-selection at the firm-level.
The empirical part of the paper has analyzed detailed Hungarian firm-level data to es-
tablish the role of exporting and importing in determining markups. Exporting proves to
be significantly positive only when we do not control for importing. This is much in line
with the potential counterbalancing effect of strong competition on export markets. This
suggestion is supported by our finding that the export premium is smaller or more negative
for firms which export to markets where competition is supposed to be stronger. Importers,
on the other hand, have a robustly positive markup premium, which is only partly explained
by their productivity premium. This provides evidence for our hypothesis that importing
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may result in quality improvements as well as higher productivity.
Our empirical results are in line with other predictions of the model. The export premium
seems to be lower (or more negative) on larger and more competitive markets. Also, import
share is positively, while export share is negatively associated with markups. Also, import-
ing and exporting are strongly correlated, probably partly because of the complementarity
proposed in our framework.
In general, these results suggest that while productivity plays a very important role in
determining markups, other factors, which may affect prices even more directly can also be
significant. Our results are in line with an important role of the different levels of competition
in different markets and that quality differences can affect markups even beyond their effect
on estimated productivity. Such effects may be taken into account in welfare calculations of
trade policy changes.
An important conclusion of our results is that exporter premia may be explained to a
large degree by the high correlation between exporter and importer status. Modeling the
two decisions jointly can be important when studying many trade questions. The potential
complementarity between the two modes emphasized in our model suggests that successful
entry into foreign markets may often require simultaneously starting importing and export-
ing. Policies helping firms to do so may be more effective then policies focusing only on
exporting.
The quality enhancing and export-helping effect of imports suggested by our results
provides an additional argument for liberalizing trade for the import of intermediate inputs
and even for policies supporting firms in finding foreign suppliers able to provide high-quality
inputs. On the other hand, the incomplete pass-through of cost savings into importers’ prices
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suggests that variable markups may play an even more important role in reducing gains from
trade than supposed by Arkolakis, Costinot, Donaldson and Rodr´ıguez-Clare (2012) who
focuses on exporter markups.
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Table 10: Exporter markup premium and foreign markets
Dependent variable: log markup
full sample domestic firms
exporter 0.034** 0.039***
(0.015) (0.013)
export intensity -0.013 -0.055
(0.034) (0.038)
– Austria -0.057** -0.039*
(0.022) (0.021)
– Belgium 0.048 -0.065
(0.068) (0.043)
– Germany -0.086*** -0.052***
(0.014) (0.013)
– Spain -0.150* -0.146**
(0.078) (0.056)
– France -0.027 0.020
(0.045) (0.060)
– UK -0.077* -0.106*
(0.043) (0.060)
– Ireland -0.240** -0.130
(0.098) (0.081)
– Italy -0.096*** -0.058
(0.018) (0.035)
– Netherlands -0.068 -0.024
(0.048) (0.076)
– Sweden -0.032 0.007
(0.050) (0.051)
– rest of EU15 -0.099 -0.045
(0.063) (0.072)
– US -0.062 -0.083*
(0.039) (0.041)
importer 0.058*** 0.065***
(0.018) (0.020)
import intensity 0.108*** 0.096***
(0.032) (0.028)
foreign 0.038***
(0.011)
log TFP(-1) 0.280*** 0.286***
(0.023) (0.026)
Size dummies yes yes
Industry-year dummies yes yes
Observations 22,651 17,416
R-squared 0.459 0.479
Notes: Markup is estimated from a value added
Translog production function following De Loecker
and Warzynski (2012). Size dummies are defined on
the number of employees (between 5 and 20, between
20 and 100, above 100). Industry-year fixed effects are
with two-digit industries. Robust standard errors with
two-digit industry clusters are in parentheses. ***
p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Figure 4: Firm markup before and after entering the foreign market
Table 11: Robustness - alternative markup estimates
Dependent variable: log markup
VA Cobb-Douglas GO Translog (composite)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (1) (2) (3) (4)
exporter 0.036 0.019 0.058** 0.027 0.011 0.017 0.029 0.029
(0.022) (0.018) (0.025) (0.022) (0.023) (0.024) (0.022) (0.022)
export intensity -0.141*** -0.084** -0.114*** -0.109***
(0.040) (0.038) (0.026) (0.026)
importer 0.154*** 0.074*** 0.134*** 0.073*** 0.099*** 0.088*** 0.086*** 0.081***
(0.011) (0.009) (0.013) (0.011) (0.007) (0.007) (0.009) (0.008)
import intensity 0.161*** 0.110*** 0.108*** 0.104***
(0.032) (0.036) (0.026) (0.025)
foreign 0.105*** 0.014 0.101*** 0.069*** 0.043*** 0.034 0.043*** 0.041***
(0.016) (0.036) (0.017) (0.018) (0.012) (0.027) (0.011) (0.012)
exporter * foreign -0.044 -0.039*
(0.031) (0.022)
importer * foreign 0.113*** 0.047**
(0.029) (0.020)
log TFP(-1) 0.287*** 0.282*** 0.230** 0.223*
(0.039) (0.039) (0.110) (0.108)
Size dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Industry-year dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Observations 31,333 22,651 31,333 22,651 31,324 22,644 31,324 22,644
R-squared 0.432 0.506 0.437 0.507 0.243 0.267 0.251 0.275
Notes: Markup is estimated from a value added Translog production function following De Loecker and Warzynski (2012).
Size dummies are defined on the number of employees (between 5 and 20, between 20 and 100, above 100). Industry-year
fixed effects are with two-digit industries. Robust standard errors with two-digit industry clusters are in parentheses. ***
p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 12: Robustness - alternative estimation samples
Dependent variable: log markup
1992-2003 1998-2003
(1) (2) (3) (4) (1) (2) (3) (4)
exporter 0.016 -0.002 0.039** 0.011 0.021 -0.000 0.037* 0.005
(0.014) (0.009) (0.016) (0.012) (0.015) (0.014) (0.018) (0.017)
export intensity -0.141*** -0.101** -0.107** -0.068
(0.035) (0.037) (0.040) (0.042)
importer 0.125*** 0.055*** 0.108*** 0.051*** 0.131*** 0.066*** 0.112*** 0.061***
(0.008) (0.010) (0.009) (0.010) (0.010) (0.011) (0.013) (0.013)
import intensity 0.141*** 0.103*** 0.150*** 0.106***
(0.021) (0.024) (0.037) (0.036)
foreign 0.064*** 0.021 0.063*** 0.045*** 0.048*** 0.006 0.042** 0.029*
(0.015) (0.031) (0.015) (0.012) (0.013) (0.038) (0.016) (0.015)
exporter * foreign -0.026 -0.039
(0.044) (0.043)
importer * foreign 0.056** 0.071***
(0.024) (0.023)
log TFP(-1) 0.281*** 0.275*** 0.254*** 0.250***
(0.017) (0.016) (0.036) (0.035)
Size dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Industry-year dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Observations 32,000 23,405 32,000 23,405 26,299 18,009 26,299 18,009
R-squared 0.344 0.412 0.349 0.415 0.405 0.445 0.408 0.446
Notes: Markup is estimated from a value added Translog production function following De Loecker and Warzynski (2012).
Size dummies are defined on the number of employees (between 5 and 20, between 20 and 100, above 100). Industry-year
fixed effects are with two-digit industries. Robust standard errors with two-digit industry clusters are in parentheses. ***
p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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